ECONOMIC-IMPLICATIONS OF IMPERFECT QUALITY CERTIFICATION

被引：29

作者：

DE, S ^{[1
]}

NABAR, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] SO METHODIST UNIV,EDWIN L COX SCH BUSINESS,DALLAS,TX 75275

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 37卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-U

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Imperfect but efficient third-party certification of unobserved product quality in a market under asymmetric information results in equilibrium outcomes which are very different from those implied by models of perfect certification and have a number of interesting economic implications.

引用

页码：333 / 337

页数：5

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