THE EFFECTS OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND DIRECT INCENTIVES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE

被引：856

作者：

HERMALIN, BE ^{[1
]}

WEISBACH, MS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,ECON,ROCHESTER,NY 14627

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 1991年 / 20卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3665716

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the relationship between top management compensation and corporate performance in public utilities. Previous researchers have argued that incentives for profitability are not needed in public utilities, since regulation provides assured profits. Earlier empirical work supports this claim. We reexamine this issue and provide several methodological improvements over prior studies. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that compensation packages for senior managers in public utilities are constructed to provide them with incentives to maximize stockholders' wealth.

引用

页码：101 / 112

页数：12