THE ECONOMY OF HIGH WAGES - AN AGENCY PROBLEM

被引:29
作者
EATON, C [1 ]
WHITE, WD [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,URBANA,IL 61801
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2554059
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
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页码:175 / 181
页数:7
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