AGENT COMPENSATION AND THE LIMITS OF BONDING

被引：43

作者：

EATON, BC ^{[1
]}

WHITE, WD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,CHICAGO,IL 60680

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1982年 / 20卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00351.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：330 / 343

页数：14

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