EQUILIBRIUM BID FUNCTIONS FOR AUCTIONS WITH AN UNCERTAIN NUMBER OF BIDDERS

被引：62

作者：

HARSTAD, RM

KAGEL, JH

LEVIN, D

机构：

[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260

[2] UNIV HOUSTON,HOUSTON,TX 77204

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1990年 / 33卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction. In a symmetric model with risk-neutral bidders holding independent information, we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals. Five auctions are revenue-equivalent: first-price and second-price auctions, each with the number of bidders known or uncertain, and English auctions. © 1990.

引用

页码：35 / 40

页数：6

共 9 条

[1]

HARSTAD RM, 1987, PROOFS OPTIMAL AUCTI

[2] SYMMETRICAL BIDDING IN 2ND-PRICE, COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS [J].