DEFAULT, SETTLEMENT, AND SIGNALING - LENDING RESUMPTION IN A REPUTATIONAL MODEL OF SOVEREIGN DEBT

被引：84

作者：

COLE, HL

DOW, J

ENGLISH, WB

机构：

[1] LONDON BUSINESS SCH,INST FINANCE & ACCOUNTING,LONDON,ENGLAND

[2] FED RESERVE SYST,BOARD GOVERNORS,WASHINGTON,DC 20551

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1995年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2527201

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments. This implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement, but after varying periods of exclusion.

引用

页码：365 / 385

页数：21

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