A SIGNAL-JAMMING THEORY OF PREDATION

被引：207

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

TIROLE, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1986年 / 17卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555717

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：366 / 376

页数：11

共 22 条

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