AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

被引：98

作者：

ANTLE, R

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 1984年 / 22卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2490699

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1 / 20

页数：20

共 38 条

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