A MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTION WITH SUPERADDITIVE VALUES

被引:17
作者
GALE, I
机构
[1] University of Wisconsin, Madison
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(90)90139-R
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A multiple-object auction is studied in which bidders' valuations are determined in a production game. The objects could be operating licenses or capacity. Expected revenue is maximized when they are all sold to a single bidder. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:323 / 328
页数:6
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[2]  
GALE I, 1989, 1989 SUMM M EC SOC A
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MORRISON SA, 1989, BROOKINGS PAPERS EC
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MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) :58-73