JOINT PROJECTS WITHOUT COMMITMENT

被引：157

作者：

ADMATI, AR ^{[1
]}

PERRY, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1991年 / 58卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297967

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. We analyse a game in which partners alternate in making contributions to the project until the project is completed. Contributions are sunk when they are made. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which is inefficient in the sense that socially desirable projects may not be completed. By contrast, in a “subscription game” in which the cost of the contribution is borne only if and when the contributions committed to the project cover its cost, the outcome is efficient. © 1991 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

引用

页码：259 / 276

页数：18