MORAL HAZARD AND INFORMATION SHARING - A MODEL OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION GATHERING AGENCIES

被引:105
作者
MILLON, MH [1 ]
THAKOR, AV [1 ]
机构
[1] INDIANA UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2328121
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:1403 / 1422
页数:20
相关论文
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