Business group affiliation and firm performance in a transition economy: A focus on ownership voids

被引：9

作者：

Ma X. ^{[1
]}

Yao X. ^{[2
]}

Xi Y. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Business Policy Department, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117592

[2] Organization and Management Department, School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, 710049 Shaanxi Province

来源：

Asia Pacific Journal of Management | 2006年 / 23卷 / 4期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Business group; Institutional perspective; Performance; Property rights theory; Transition economy;

D O I：

10.1007/s10490-006-9011-6

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In a transition economy, how does business group affiliation make a difference in firm performance? Under the broad label of institutional voids, what specific voids can business groups fill? This paper addresses these questions by drawing on insights from property rights theory and an institutional perspective. We argue that ownership voids, as a subset of institutional voids, occur due to the lack of unambiguously specified ownership of state assets in transition economies, and that business groups emerge to serve as the direct owners of state-owned enterprises to replace such voids. Based on a sample of 1,119 publicly-listed Chinese companies, we find that the interaction of business group affiliation and state ownership has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Our findings point to business group's substitution role in filling ownership voids in China's transition economy. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006.

引用

页码：467 / 483

页数：16

共 75 条

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