Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea

被引:291
作者
Chang, SJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Seoul 136701, South Korea
关键词
D O I
10.5465/30040617
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determines ownership structure but not vice versa and provide strong evidence that controlling shareholders use insider information to take direct and indirect equity stakes in profitable or promising firms and transfer profits to affiliates through intragroup trade. These findings highlight the importance of further studying the "agency problems" that controlling shareholders present for minority shareholders, especially in business groups.
引用
收藏
页码:238 / 253
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
[21]  
Granovetter Mark., 1995, IND CORP CHANGE, V4, P93, DOI [DOI 10.1093/ICC/4.1.93, 10.1093/icc/4.1.93]
[22]   Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance [J].
Himmelberg, CP ;
Hubbard, RG ;
Palia, D .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1999, 53 (03) :353-384
[23]  
HOSKISSON RE, 1994, ACAD MANAGE J, V37, P1207, DOI 10.5465/256671
[24]  
Hsiao C., 2003, ANAL PANEL DATA, DOI [10.1017/CBO9781139839327, DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511754203]
[25]   THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J].
JENSEN, MC ;
MECKLING, WH .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) :305-360
[26]   Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis [J].
Johnson, S ;
Boone, P ;
Breach, A ;
Friedman, E .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 58 (1-2) :141-186
[27]  
JOHNSTON J, 1984, EC METHODS
[28]  
KANG J, 1995, J FINANC ECON, V7, P151
[29]   INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AS SYSTEMS OF CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE [J].
KESTER, WC .
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1992, 8 (03) :24-44
[30]  
KIM K, 1996, ANAL KOREAN EC, V2, P147