Fairness and retaliation:: The economics of reciprocity

被引:1504
作者
Fehr, E [1 ]
Gächter, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empirical Econ Res, Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.14.3.159
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of competition in markets with incomplete contracts and gives rise to noncompetitive wage differences. Finally, reciprocity it is also a strong force contributing to the existence of incomplete contracts.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 181
页数:23
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