Do pennies matter? Investor relations consequences of small negative earnings surprises

被引:74
作者
Frankel, Richard [1 ]
Mayew, William J. [2 ]
Sun, Yan [3 ]
机构
[1] Washington Univ, Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[2] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[3] St Louis Univ, John Cook Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63108 USA
关键词
Investor relations; Earnings benchmarks; Conference calls; Analysts; CONFERENCE CALLS; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; MANAGEMENT; ANALYSTS; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11142-009-9089-4
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Anecdotal and survey evidence suggest that managers take actions to avoid small negative earnings surprises because they fear disproportionate, negative stock-price effects. However, empirical research has failed to document an asymmetric pricing effect. We investigate investor relations costs as an alternative incentive for managers to avoid small negative earnings surprises. Guided by CFO survey evidence from Graham et al. (J Account Econ 40:3-73, 2005), we operationalize investor relations costs using conference call characteristics-call length, call tone, and earnings forecasting propensity around the conference call. We find an asymmetric increase (decrease) in call length (forecasting propensity) for firms that miss analyst expectations by 1 cent compared with changes in adjacent 1-cent intervals. We find no statistically significant evidence that call tone is asymmetrically more negative for firms that miss expectations by a penny. While these results provide some statistical evidence to confirm managerial claims documented in Graham et al. (J Account Econ 40:3-73, 2005) regarding the asymmetrically negative effects of missing expectations, our tests do not suggest severe economic effects.
引用
收藏
页码:220 / 242
页数:23
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