Cooperation in Service Systems

被引:58
作者
Anily, Shoshana [1 ]
Haviv, Moshe [2 ]
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Fac Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Stat, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
COST ALLOCATION; INVENTORY; OPTIMIZATION; MODEL;
D O I
10.1287/opre.1090.0737
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers. This economies-of-scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady-state mean total number of customers in the system. The question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system. When the individual incoming streams of customers form Poisson processes and individual service times are exponential, we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers (or jobs) in the pooled system. We show that, despite the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave, the game and its subgames possess nonempty cores. In other words, for any subset of servers there exist cost-sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition. We give an explicit expression for all (infinitely many) nonnegative core cost allocations of this game. Finally, we show that, except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost, there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries, and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid to join the grand coalition.
引用
收藏
页码:660 / 673
页数:14
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