No-envy in queueing problems

被引:37
作者
Chun, Youngsub [1 ]
机构
[1] Seoul Natl Univ, Sch Econ, Seoul 151742, South Korea
关键词
queueing problem; no-envy; cost monotonicity; identical preferences lower bound; egalitarian equivalence;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-005-0011-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
how agents should be affected as a consequence of changes in the waiting costs. However, there is no rule satisfying efficiency, noenvy, and either one of two cost monotonicity axioms. To remedy the situation, we propose modifications of no-envy, adjusted no-envyand backward/forward no-envy. Finally, we discuss whether three fairness requirements, no-envy, the identical preferences lower bound, and egalitarian equivalence, are compatible in this context.
引用
收藏
页码:151 / 162
页数:12
相关论文
共 19 条
[1]   FAIR ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND CRITERIA OF JUSTICE [J].
ALKAN, A ;
DEMANGE, G ;
GALE, D .
ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (04) :1023-1039
[2]  
[Anonymous], SOCIAL GOALS SOCIAL
[3]   Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods [J].
Bevia, C .
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1996, 13 (01) :113-126
[4]  
BEVIA C, 1998, REV ECON DES, V3, P195
[5]  
CHUN Y, 2005, UNPUB CHARACTERIZATI
[6]  
CHUN Y, 2004, UNPUB MATH SOCIAL SC
[7]   INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING PROBLEMS [J].
DOLAN, RJ .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1978, 9 (02) :421-436
[8]  
Foley D., 1967, Yale Economic Essays, P45, DOI DOI 10.4324/9780203009826
[9]   A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems [J].
Maniquet, F .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2003, 109 (01) :90-103
[10]   Mechanism design in queueing problems [J].
Mitra, M .
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2001, 17 (02) :277-305