A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

被引：95

作者：

Maniquet, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fac Univ Notre Dame Paix, Fac Sci Econ & Sociales, B-5000 Namur, Belgium

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2003年 / 109卷 / 01期

关键词：

queueing problems; Shapley value; impatience independence; equal responsibility;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00036-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents' impatience, and an equal responsibility property. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：90 / 103

页数：14

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