Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems

被引：356

作者：

Abdulkadiroglu, A ^{[1
]}

Sonmez, T

机构：

[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2998580

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：689 / 701

页数：13

共 7 条

[1] EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS TO POSITIONS [J].

HYLLAND, A ;

ZECKHAUSER, R .

[2]

Moulin H., 1995, Cooperative microeconomics: a game-theoretic introduction

[3] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS [J].

ROTH, AE .

[4]

Roth Alvin E., 1977, Journal of Mathematical Economics, V4, P131

[5] STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AT DIFFERENTIABLE POINTS [J].

SATTERTHWAITE, MA ;

SONNENSCHEIN, H .

[6]

Shapley L., 1974, J MATH ECON, V1, P23, DOI [10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0]

[7] ON A CONJECTURE BY GALE ABOUT ONE-SIDED MATCHING PROBLEMS [J].

ZHOU, L .