A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness

被引:256
作者
Cox, James C.
Friedman, Daniel
Gjerstad, Steven
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Georgia State Univ, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[3] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
experimental economics; game theory; ordered probit; reciprocity; altruism;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 45
页数:29
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