Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment

被引:187
作者
Bosman, R [1 ]
van Winden, F [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.0j677
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this experimental study of a two player power-to-take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game, The game has two stages, First, one player can claim any part of the other's income (take rate). Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show: (1) a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions; (2) negative emotions drive destruction; (3) at high emotional intensity, responders destroy everything; (4) expectations affect the probability of punishment. E)notional hazard is identified as a new source of efficiency costs.
引用
收藏
页码:147 / 169
页数:23
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