Property rights and finance

被引：533

作者：

Johnson, S

McMillan, J

Woodruff, C

机构：

[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Univ Calif San Diego, Grad Sch Int Relat & Pacific Studies, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2002年 / 92卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282802762024539

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector. investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

引用

页码：1335 / 1356

页数：22

共 31 条

[11] Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform -: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared [J].