The Economics of Two-Sided Markets

被引:644
作者
Rysman, Marc [1 ]
机构
[1] Boston Univ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1257/jep.23.3.125
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. In the case of a video game system, for instance PlayStation, the intermediary is the console producer - Sony - while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is not. Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation. Many more products fit into this paradigm, such as search engines, newspapers, and almost any advertiser-supported media (examples in which consumers typically negatively value, rather than positively value, the participation of the other side), as well as most software or title-based operating systems and consumer electronics. This paper seeks to explain what two-sided markets are and why they interest economists. I discuss the strategies that firms typically consider, and I highlight a number of puzzling outcomes from the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets. Finally, I consider the implications for public policy, particularly antitrust and regulatory policy, where there have been a number of recent issues involving media, computer operating systems, and payment cards.
引用
收藏
页码:125 / 143
页数:19
相关论文
共 39 条
[11]   NETWORK EFFECTS, SOFTWARE PROVISION, AND STANDARDIZATION [J].
CHURCH, J ;
GANDAL, N .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1992, 40 (01) :85-103
[12]  
CORTS K, INT J IND O IN PRESS
[13]   STRATEGIC MANEUVERING AND MASS-MARKET DYNAMICS - THE TRIUMPH OF VHS OVER BETA [J].
CUSUMANO, MA ;
MYLONADIS, Y ;
ROSENBLOOM, RS .
BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, 1992, 66 (01) :51-94
[14]   Competing matchmaking [J].
Damiano, Ettore ;
Li, Hao .
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2008, 6 (04) :789-818
[15]  
Eisenmann T., 2007, STAGING 2 SIDED PLAT
[16]   Knife-edge or plateau: When do market models tip? [J].
Ellison, G ;
Fudenberg, D .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2003, 118 (04) :1249-1278
[17]   Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet [J].
Ellison, Glenn ;
Ellison, Sara Fisher .
ECONOMETRICA, 2009, 77 (02) :427-452
[18]  
Evans DavidS., 2003, YALE J REGULATION, V20, P325
[19]  
EVANS DS, 2005, ANAL MARKET DEFINITI
[20]  
*FED TRAD COMM, 2009, WEBP 3 DO COURTS AG