How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?

被引：2023

作者：

Villalonga, Belen

Amit, Raphael

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 80卷 / 02期

关键词：

family firms; ownership; control; management; value;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：385 / 417

页数：33

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