Family firms

被引：753

作者：

Burkart, M ^{[1
]}

Panunzi, F

Shleifer, A

机构：

[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

[2] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[3] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2003年 / 58卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1540-6261.00601

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

引用

页码：2167 / 2201

页数：35

共 37 条

[1] Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].