Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior

被引:78
作者
Alm, James [2 ]
Jackson, Betty R. [3 ]
McKee, Michael [1 ]
机构
[1] Appalachian State Univ, Dept Econ, Boone, NC 28608 USA
[2] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[3] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
关键词
Tax compliance; Tax audits; Social norms; TAX EVASION; TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE; AUDIT; UNCERTAINTY; DECISION; SYSTEMS; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the Current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results. The information includes "official" information disseminated by the tax authority, and "unofficial", or informal, communications among tax payers. Our results,; indicate that the effect of the type of post-audit information is conditional oil whether the taxpayer is well informed of the audit rate prior to filing. We find that the tax authority would be served by pre-announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:392 / 402
页数:11
相关论文
共 36 条
[31]  
Slemrod Joel, 2000, NBER Working Paper 7473, DOI [DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80026-X, 10.3386/w7473, DOI 10.3386/W7473]
[32]  
SMITH VL, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P923
[33]   MONETARY REWARDS AND DECISION COST IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS [J].
SMITH, VL ;
WALKER, JM .
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1993, 31 (02) :245-261
[34]  
*US DEP TIGTA, 2002, MAN ADV REP INT REV
[35]  
Webley Paul., 1991, Tax Evasion. An Experimental Approach
[36]  
Wooldridge J., 2001, ECONOMETRIC ANAL CRO