Trade's dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution

被引:56
作者
Fernandez, L [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Environm Sci, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
[2] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Econ, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeem.2001.1187
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the U.S.-Mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs, public health damages, and trade benefits. Noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages. Results show trade liberalization leads Mexico to curtail pollution in both games. Cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the United States from Mexico's Pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:386 / 411
页数:26
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