Management control and innovative activity

被引：35

作者：

Czarnitzki, D

Kraft, K

机构：

[1] Ctr European Econ Res ZEW, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Dortmund, D-44227 Dortmund, Germany

来源：

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2004年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

censored regression models; incentives; innovative activity; managerial versus owner-led firms;

D O I：

10.1023/B:REIO.0000031361.27597.7c

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 4,126 observations is used to estimate Tobit and semiparametric censored least absolute deviation ( CLAD) models. It turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the manager-led firms, we have mixed results concerning the question whether expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted.

引用

页码：1 / 24

页数：24

共 47 条

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