Does the Location of Directors Matter? Information Acquisition and Board Decisions

被引:104
作者
Alam, Zinat S. [1 ]
Chen, Mark A. [2 ]
Ciccotello, Conrad S. [2 ]
Ryan, Harley E., Jr. [2 ]
机构
[1] Florida Atlantic Univ, Coll Business, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
[2] Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
关键词
CEO TURNOVER; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MORAL HAZARD; TRADE-OFF; DETERMINANTS; BUSINESS; SIZE; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1017/S002210901400012X
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using data on over 4,000 individual residential addresses, we find that geographic distance between directors and corporate headquarters is related to information acquisition and board decisions. The fraction of a board's unaffiliated directors who live near headquarters is higher when information-gathering needs are greater. When the fraction of unaffiliated directors living near headquarters is lower, nonroutine chief executive officer (CEO) turnover is more sensitive to stock performance. Also, the level, intensity, and sensitivity of CEO equity-based pay increase with board distance. Overall, our results suggest that geographic location is an important dimension of board structure that influences directors' costs of gathering information.
引用
收藏
页码:131 / 164
页数:34
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