The exploitation of relationships in financial distress: The case of trade credit

被引:324
作者
Wilner, BS [1 ]
机构
[1] LECG Navigant Consulting, Evanston, IL USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/0022-1082.00203
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper develops optimal pricing, lending, and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other. Long-term trade-creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors. Anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions, not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit, but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit. The model also explains the existence of "teaser" interest rates and convenience classes. Findings are consistent with those of the relationship-lending literature.
引用
收藏
页码:153 / 178
页数:26
相关论文
共 32 条
[11]   A PURE FINANCIAL EXPLANATION FOR TRADE CREDIT [J].
EMERY, GW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1984, 19 (03) :271-285
[12]   AN OPTIMAL FINANCIAL RESPONSE TO VARIABLE DEMAND [J].
EMERY, GW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1987, 22 (02) :209-225
[13]  
EVANS JD, 1998, UNPUB ARE LENDING RE, pCH11
[14]  
FABOZZI FJ, 1993, J FIXED INCOME, V3, P6
[15]  
FRANK M, 1995, UNPUB WHY MOST COMME
[16]   Control rights, debt structure, and the loss of private benefits: The case of the UK insolvency code [J].
Franks, JR ;
Nyborg, KG .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1996, 9 (04) :1165-1210
[17]  
Freixas X., 1993, SHORT TERM CREDIT VE
[18]   The Resolution of Financial Distress [J].
Giammarino, Ronald M. .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1989, 2 (01) :25-47
[19]  
*INT REV SERV, 1997, STAT INC
[20]   Credit cycles [J].
Kiyotaki, N ;
Moore, J .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1997, 105 (02) :211-248