Deposit insurance around the globe:: Where does it work?

被引:153
作者
Demirgüç-Kunt, A
Kane, EJ
机构
[1] World Bank, Dev Res Grp, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] Boston Coll, Carroll Sch Management, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0895330027319
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 195
页数:21
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