IS DEPOSIT INSURANCE NECESSARY - A HISTORICAL-PERSPECTIVE

被引：121

作者：

CALOMIRIS, CW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] FED RESERVE BANK CHICAGO,DEPT RES,CHICAGO,IL 60604

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY | 1990年 / 50卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0022050700036433

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The motivation and structure of various banking insurance experiments in U.S. history are analyzed, along with their political alternative, branch banks. In both the antebellum period and in the 1920s, insurance systems that relied on self-regulation, made credible by mutual liability, were successful, while compulsory state systems were not. Branch banking increased stability and resiliency to shocks. © 1990, The Economic History Association. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：283 / 295

页数：13