Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

被引:41
作者
Lavertu, Stephane [1 ]
Lewis, David E. [2 ]
Moynihan, Donald P. [3 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, John Glenn Sch Publ Affairs, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Ctr Study Democrat Inst, Greenvale, NY 11548 USA
[3] Univ Wisconsin, Follette Sch Publ Affairs, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
ASSESSMENT RATING TOOL; PART; PRESIDENTS;
D O I
10.1111/puar.12132
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government-wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (liberal agencies) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (conservative agencies) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agenciesliberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacityand partly by the ideological beliefs of employeeson average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.
引用
收藏
页码:845 / 857
页数:13
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