CEO incentives and earnings management

被引：1084

作者：

Bergstresser, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Philippon, Thomas

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 80卷 / 03期

关键词：

earnings management; stock options; CEO compensation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO's potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In addition, during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options and CEOs and other insiders sell large quantities of shares. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：511 / 529

页数：19