Resolving Information Asymmetry: Signaling, Endorsement, and Crowdfunding Success

被引：499

作者：

Courtney, Christopher ^{[1
]}

Dutta, Supradeep ^{[1
]}

Li, Yong ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] SUNY Buffalo, Operat Management & Strategy, Sch Management, Jacobs Management Ctr 343, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA

[2] SUNY Buffalo, Operat Management & Strategy, Sch Management, Jacobs Management Ctr 326K, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA

来源：

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE | 2017年 / 41卷 / 02期

关键词：

VENTURE CAPITALISTS; MEDIA RICHNESS; REPUTATION; MARKETS; FIRMS; PERFORMANCE; IMPACT; DETERMINANTS; UNCERTAINTY; INNOVATION;

D O I：

10.1111/etap.12267

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article draws on information economics to examine when signals and endorsements obtained from multiple information sources enhance or diminish one another's effects. We propose that signals through start-up actions (use of media) and characteristics (crowdfunding experience) can mitigate information asymmetry concerns about project quality and founder credibility, enhancing the project's likelihood of attaining funding. Further, we posit that while start-up-originated signals offset each other's effects, third-party endorsements (sentiment expressed in backer comments) validate and complement start-uporiginated signals. Empirical analyses based on a comprehensive dataset of crowdfunding projects on the Kickstarter website during 2009-2015 confirm our predictions.

引用

页码：265 / 290

页数：26

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