Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

被引:117
作者
Goltsman, Maria [1 ]
Hoerner, Johannes [4 ]
Pavlov, Gregory [1 ]
Squintani, Francesco [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Dept Econ, Social Sci Ctr, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
[2] Univ Brescia, Dept Econ, I-25122 Brescia, Italy
[3] Univ Essex, Dept Econ, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
[4] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
Communication; Information; Mechanism design; Cheap talk; Long cheap talk; Arbitration; Mediation; Negotiation; COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION; DELEGATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare three common dispute resolution processes - negotiation, mediation, and arbitration - in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]. Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the pat-ties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to the third party recommendation. We characterize and compare the optimal mediation and arbitration procedures. Both mediators and arbitrators should optimally filter information, but mediators should also add noise to it. We find that unmediated negotiation performs as well as mediation if and only if the degree of conflict between the parties is low. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1397 / 1420
页数:24
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