Long cheap talk

被引：134

作者：

Aumann, RJ ^{[1
]}

Hart, S

机构：

[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rational & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Study Rational, Dept Econ, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2003年 / 71卷 / 06期

关键词：

cheap talk; communication; long conversation; incomplete information; game theory; signalling; joint lottery; dimartingale; di-span;

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.00465

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.

引用

页码：1619 / 1660

页数：42

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