Nuclear Weapons as Shields

被引:17
作者
Beardsley, Kyle [1 ]
Asal, Victor [2 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] SUNY Albany, Rockefeller Coll, Albany, NY 12222 USA
关键词
deterrence; international crisis behavior; nuclear weapons; PROLIFERATION; ESCALATION; CONFLICT; DETERRENCE; MODELS; DYADS;
D O I
10.1177/0738894209104550
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
What security benefits do nuclear weapons provide to their possessors? After accounting for two potential selection effects, the empirical evidence from all international crises from 1945 to 2000 indicates that opponents of nuclear-weapon states demonstrate restraint in turning to violent aggression. Nuclear weapons, however, have little effect on overall crisis occurrence. The authors also explore the behavioral effects of nuclear-weapons programs and find that program states have a higher proclivity for crisis occurrence.
引用
收藏
页码:235 / 255
页数:21
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