Do the SEC's enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct?

被引：458

作者：

Kedia, Simi ^{[2
]}

Rajgopal, Shiva ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Emory Univ, Goizueta Business Sch, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA

[2] Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 51卷 / 03期

关键词：

SEC; Restatement; Enforcement; Distance; Information asymmetry; STOCK OPTION PLANS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS; EQUITY INCENTIVES; GEOGRAPHY; CONSEQUENCES; SPILLOVERS; IMPACT; CRIME; COST;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.01.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Recent frauds have questioned the efficacy of the SEC's enforcement program. We hypothesize that differences in firms' information sets about SEC enforcement and constraints facing the SEC affect firms' proclivity to adopt aggressive accounting practices. We find that firms located closer to the SEC and in areas with greater past SEC enforcement activity, both proxies for firms' information about SEC enforcement, are less likely to restate their financial statements. Consistent with the resource-constrained SEC view, the SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices. Our results suggest that regulation is most effective when it is local. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：259 / 278

页数：20

共 39 条

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