Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food aid procurement

被引:30
作者
Bagchi, Aniruddha [2 ]
Paul, Jomon Aliyas [2 ]
Maloni, Michael [1 ]
机构
[1] Kennesaw State Univ, Dept Management & Entrepreneurship, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USA
[2] Kennesaw State Univ, Dept Econ Finance & Quantitat Anal, Kennesaw, GA 30144 USA
关键词
Auctions; Procurement; Humanitarian logistics; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.07.004
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
The competitive bid process used by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian food aid is subject to bidder gaming that can increase prices and deter competition. Additionally, suppliers and carriers are matched after bid submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine the optimal auction mechanism to minimize gaming then justify pre-bid planning between suppliers and carriers using properties of the cost distribution functions. We operationalize these changes with a uniform price auction. The improved mechanism should deter gaming, enhance bid participation, and increase delivered food aid volumes. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:238 / 245
页数:8
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