A Negotiation-Credit-Auction mechanism for procuring customized products

被引：16

作者：

Chen, Songlin ^{[1
]}

Tseng, Mitchell M. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Div Syst & Engn Management, Sch Mech & Aerosp Engn, Singapore 639798, Singapore

[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Adv Mfg Inst, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 127卷 / 01期

关键词：

Customization; Procurement; Negotiation; Auction; Bidding credits; MASS CUSTOMIZATION; E-PROCUREMENT; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.06.001

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

Customization promises higher value creation by matching customers' individual specific needs with manufacturers' capabilities. However, difficulties in terms of information asymmetry, information stickiness, and conflicting incentives prevent customers from effectively tapping into the value of customization in procurement. This research conceptualizes procurement of customized products as a transaction problem with an embedded design problem. A Negotiation-Credit-Auction mechanism is developed to separate design and transaction into two stages and employ negotiation and auction, respectively. Bidding credits are introduced in an intermediate stage as an instrument for incentive adjustment. This hybrid mechanism proves to be socially efficient and provides necessary flexibility as well as incentives for innovation in customization. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：203 / 210

页数：8

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