The duration of bank relationships

被引:197
作者
Ongena, S
Smith, DC [1 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Finance, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Fed Reserve Syst, Board Governors, Div Int Finance, Washington, DC 20551 USA
关键词
bank relationships; hazard models; duration analysis;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00069-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze the duration of bank relationships using a unique panel data set of listed firms and their banks from the bank-dominated Norwegian market. We find that firms are more likely to leave a bank as the relationship matures. Small, profitable, and highly leveraged firms maintain shorter bank relationships, as do firms with multiple bank relationships. These findings are robust to censoring, alternate specifications for the distribution of relationship duration, and other control variables relevant to the Norwegian market. Overall., our results cast doubt on theories suggesting that firms become locked into bank relationships. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science S.A.
引用
收藏
页码:449 / 475
页数:27
相关论文
共 40 条
[1]   RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND LINES OF CREDIT IN SMALL FIRM FINANCE [J].
BERGER, AN ;
UDELL, GF .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1995, 68 (03) :351-381
[2]   SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INTERESTS - CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH MULTIPLE INVESTORS [J].
BERGLOF, E ;
VONTHADDEN, EL .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) :1055-1084
[3]   ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION-SOURCES AND THE INFORMATION-CONTENT OF BANK LOANS [J].
BEST, R ;
ZHANG, H .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1993, 48 (04) :1507-1522
[4]   THE EFFECT OF LENDER IDENTITY ON A BORROWING FIRMS EQUITY RETURN [J].
BILLETT, MT ;
FLANNERY, MJ ;
GARFINKEL, JA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (02) :699-718
[5]   MORAL HAZARD AND SECURED LENDING IN AN INFINITELY REPEATED CREDIT MARKET GAME [J].
BOOT, AWA ;
THAKOR, AV .
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1994, 35 (04) :899-920
[6]   REPUTATION, RENEGOTIATION, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN BANK LOANS AND PUBLICLY TRADED DEBT [J].
CHEMMANUR, TJ ;
FULGHIERI, P .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1994, 7 (03) :475-506
[7]  
COX DR, 1972, J R STAT SOC B, V34, P187
[8]   Multiple versus single banking relationships: Theory and evidence [J].
Detragiache, E ;
Garella, P ;
Guiso, L .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (03) :1133-1161
[9]   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J].
DIAMOND, DW .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) :393-414