Contracts and productive information gathering

被引：118

作者：

Cremer, J ^{[1
]}

Khalil, F

Rochet, JC

机构：

[1] Univ Toulouse 1, GREMAQ, CNRS, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[2] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[3] Univ Washington, Dept Econ, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1998年 / 25卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1998.0651

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost gamma to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of gamma, try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D83. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：174 / 193

页数：20

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