INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT MONITORING - WHO IS THE RESIDUAL CLAIMANT

被引:37
作者
KHALIL, F
LAWARREE, J
机构
[1] UNIV LIEGE,LIEGE,BELGIUM
[2] ECARE,BRUSSELS,BELGIUM
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1995.1035
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We observe that residual claimancy can be a source of rent in a principal-agent relationship. We show that the choice between input or output monitoring will be chiefly determined by the identity of the residual claimant of the principal-agent relationship. The principal will find input monitoring more efficient if the principal is the residual claimant, and he will find output monitoring more efficient if the agent is the residual claimant. If residual claimancy is a choice, the principal will be the residual claimant under input monitoring. Under output monitoring, residual claimancy is not an issue. If both residual claimancy and the monitoring instrument can be chosen, the principal will choose to monitor input and to be the residual claimant. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L22. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:139 / 157
页数:19
相关论文
共 21 条
[1]   INTEGRATION OF THE SALES FORCE - AN EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION [J].
ANDERSON, E ;
SCHMITTLEIN, DC .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (03) :385-395
[2]  
Anderson E., 1985, MARKET SCI, V4, P234, DOI DOI 10.1287/MKSC.4.3.234
[3]  
Barzel Y., 1997, EC ANAL PROPERTY RIG
[4]   PERFORMANCE VERSUS DESIGN STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF POLLUTION [J].
BESANKO, D .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1987, 34 (01) :19-44
[5]   PRINCIPALS COMPETING FOR AN AGENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD [J].
BIGLAISER, G ;
MEZZETTI, C .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 61 (02) :302-330
[6]   GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN PRODUCTION AND INCENTIVES THEORY - A REVIEW OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS [J].
CAILLAUD, B ;
GUESNERIE, R ;
REY, P ;
TIROLE, J .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 19 (01) :1-26
[7]  
CRAMPES C, 1986, REV ECON, V5, P757
[8]  
CREMER J, 1992, AM ECON REV, V92, P566
[9]  
GALLINI NT, 1992, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V8, P471
[10]   MORAL HAZARD AND VERIFIABILITY - THE EFFECTS OF RENEGOTIATION IN AGENCY [J].
HERMALIN, BE ;
KATZ, ML .
ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (06) :1735-1753