The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom

被引:158
作者
Conyon, MJ [1 ]
Murphy, KJ
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0297.00577
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We document differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US implies that the median CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 0.25% in the UK. The differences, can be largely attributed to greater share option awards in the US arising from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries.
引用
收藏
页码:F640 / F671
页数:32
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