An optimal standing timber auction?

被引：3

作者：

Elyakime, B ^{[1
]}

Loisel, P

机构：

[1] INRA, F-31931 Toulouse, France

[2] INRA, Lab Anal Syst Biomet, F-34060 Montpellier, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF FOREST ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 11卷 / 02期

关键词：

auctions; standing timbers; value reservation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfe.2005.05.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We focus our study on a lump sum stumpage auction, with bids in total value and secret seller's reserve value. We check that the procedure examined may be ruled by a procedure dealing with total value but in which the seller would disclose his reserve strategic value. Moreover, the procedure with total value and disclosed seller's reserve strategic value may be ruled or not by a procedure on price (not on total value) and public seller's reserve price, in which buyers and seller would use the same real reference of the timber volume of the lot disclosed before the auction. (c) 2005 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：107 / 120

页数：14

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