The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry:: empirical insights from eBay auctions

被引：461

作者：

Bajari, P ^{[1
]}

Hortaçsu, A

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2003年 / 34卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1593721

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices.

引用

页码：329 / 355

页数：27

共 33 条

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