Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games

被引：64

作者：

Friedman, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Econ, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 8卷 / 04期

关键词：

learning in games; evolutionary games; evolutionary economics;

D O I：

10.1007/s001910050071

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The Theory of Learning in Games by Fudenberg and Levine surveys a key branch of evolutionary economics from a mainstream perspective. Its publication provides an opportunity to reassess the prospects and goals for evolutionary economics.

引用

页码：423 / 432

页数：10

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