Progress in behavioral game theory

被引:268
作者
Camerer, CF
机构
[1] Rea Lela G. Axline Dept. Bus. Econ., California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.11.4.167
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.
引用
收藏
页码:167 / 188
页数:22
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