In-Store Referrals on the Internet

被引：29

作者：

Cai, Gangshu ^{[1
]}

Chen, Ying-Ju ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Kansas State Univ, Dept Management, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA

[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Ind Engn & Operat Res, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF RETAILING | 2011年 / 87卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会; 中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Retailer referral; Third-party referral; Channel competition; Game theory; PRICE-DISCRIMINATION; DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL; REWARD PROGRAMS; SUPPLY-CHAIN; RETAILER; COMPETITION; INFOMEDIARIES; COORDINATION; CONFLICT; SERVICES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jretai.2011.09.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the contemporary e-business, a retailer may display the links to the competing retailers directly (direct referral), or display the referral link provided by a third-party advertising agency (third-party referral), and these referrals may be either one-way or two-way. In this paper, we show that the referrals may align the retailers' incentives and facilitate implicit collusion, and one-way referral may result in a mutually beneficial situation, thereby providing an economic rationale for these seemingly puzzling phenomena. Using third-party referrals may enhance the retailers' collusion despite the potential disutility and revenue leakage, and referral services may be detrimental for the consumer welfare. (C) 2011 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：563 / 578

页数：16